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NOTES AND COMMENTS
In an attempt to distinguish its position from that adopted in the
recent New York case 9 the majority stated that no application was made
there for a reconsideration of the constitutional question involved in the
Adkins case. The sole question ruled on by the Court in the New York
case was whether the case was distinguishable from the Adkins case.'0
If the Court had so desired, it could have avoided the effect of the
technical holding in the New York case and reconsidered the funda-
mental constitutionality of minimum wages. This question was pre-
sented the Court in October, 1936 in a petition to rehear the New York
case. The Court, however, denied the rehearing."
In a powerful dissent apparently aimed at the entire New Deal
Administration and criticising the majority for their change of policy,
Justice Sutherland declared the "judicial function is that of interpre-
tation; it does not include the power of amendment under the guise of
interpretation... If the Constitution ... stands in the way of desirable
legislation, the blame must rest on the instrument and not upon the
Court for enforcing it according to its terms. The remedy in that
situation . . .is to amend the Constitution."'12 In the judgment of the
minority, minimum wage legislation cannot be a reasonable exercise of
the state's police power.
In upholding the Washington law, much emphasis was placed on
the point that "woman's physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for
subsistence," thus necessitating legislative protection.13 Although this
case represents a reversal by the Court on the fundamental issue, there
still remains open the question of constitutionality of a general minimum
wage law applicable both to men and women.
0. W. CLAYTON, JR.
Constitutional Law-North Carolina
Unemployment Compensation.
"In September, 1935, the Alabama Unemployment Compensation
Law was enacted, and later amended in April, 1936.1 This Act pro-
'Morehead v. People of New York, 298 U. S. 587, 56 Sup. Ct. 918, 80 L. ed.
1347 (1936).
" Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785
(1922), cited supra note 4.
n Morehead v. People of New York, 57 Sup. Ct. 4, 81 L. ed. Ad. Op. 65
(1936).
" West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 587, 81 L. ed. Ad. Op.
455, 465.
' 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 583, 81 L. ed. Ad. Op. 455, 460. This same argument as
to woman's physical structure has been advanced to uphold other laws regulating
their employment. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L. ed.
551 (1908).
1 GEN. AcTs Ax. 1935, p. 950; GEN. AcTs ALA. 1936, Ex. Sess., pp. 176, 225,
228.
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vides that employers of eight or more employees must pay approxi-
mately two-thirds of the contributions to be paid by employers and
employees out of payrolls to a general fund for benefits to unemployed.
Two actions were instituted by employers to obtain injunctions against
the collection of these contributions. The Act was assailed as unconsti-
tutional both under the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment and under the Alabama Constitution. A three-
judge Federal District Court held the Act unconstitutional. The Court
found that arbitrarily classifying only employers having eight or more
employees as within the Act was a denial of due process and equal
protection of the law; and that the requirement that employers pay
about two-thirds of the contributions to the general fund for the benefit
of the unemployed with no direct benefit to themselves violated the
provisions of the Alabama Constitution.2 In a five-four decision this
has been reversed by the United States Supreme Court.2-
The Federal Social Security Act3 makes provisions for unemploy-
ment compensation, but leaves its actual operation and the numerous
details connected therewith to the states under their own laws.4 The
North Carolina Legislature at a special session enacted the North
Carolina Unemployment Compensation Law in December, 1936.5 Like
the Alabama Act the law only applies to employers of eight or more0 ,
and certain types of employment are excluded from the Act.7 Employ-
ers pay contributions in relation to their payrolls,8 which go into a
IGulf States Paper Corp. v. Carmichael; Southern Coal and Coke Co. v. Same,
17 F. Supp. 225 (M. D. Ala. 1936). The Supreme Court of Alabama has held the
Act constitutional. Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Kaufman, 174 So. 516 (Ala. 1937).
This is a final adjudication upon the latter ground relied upon by the federal district
court in the principal case. Similar statutes in other states have been held constitu-
tional. Gillum v. Johnson, 62 P. (2d) 1037 (Cal. 1936) ; Howes Brothers Co. v.
Massachusetts U. C. Comm. 5 N. E. (2d) 720 (Mass. 1936); W. H. H. Chamber-
lin, Inc. v. Andrews; E. C Stearns and Co. v. Same: Associated Industries of N. Y.
State, Inc. v. Department of Labor of N. Y., 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22
(1936), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided court, AMr. Justice Stone not
participating, 57 Sup. Ct. 122 (1936).
The sections of the Federal Social Security Act dealing with unemployment
compensation have been held constitutional in Chas. C. Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 57 Sup. Ct. 883 (1937), affirming 89 F. (2d) 207 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). The
Federal Act is not considered in this note.
2 Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co.; Carmichael v. Gulf States
Paper Corp., 57 Sup. Ct. 868 (1937).
$49 Stat. 620 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §§301-1305 (Supp. 1936).
"The provisions of the 90 per cent credit device make it highly desirable for
states to enact laws in conformity with the Federal Act. 49 Stat. 639 (1935), 42
U. S. C. A. §1102 (Supp. 1936).
P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1. See p. 377, supra.
Old. §19(f) 1.
7Employment by the Federal Government, State, or any of its political sub-
divisions; employment as agricultural labor; as domestic servants; employment
in navigation; family employment; and employment by religious, charitable, sci-
entific, literary, or educational organizations. P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1,
§19(g)7.
80.9 per cent, 1936; 1.8 per cent, 1937; 2.7 per cent, 1938 and thereafter.
P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1, §7(b).
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pooled fund.9 No contributions are required of employees.' 0 Benefits
do not become payable until January 1, 1938.11
Like the Alabama Act the North Carolina Act will stand the test of
constitutionality. Under its police power a state may levy taxes for the
general welfare. "An ulterior public advantage may justify a compara-
tively insignificant taking of private property for what in its immediate
purpose is a private use."1 2 The contributions may well be considered
"not a penalty but an industrial cost charged to those who control the
profits of industry, who can adjust it, absorb it, and pass it on in in-
creased prices to the consuming public which ultimately benefits and ulti-
mately pays for it."'' 3 Cases arising under the Workmen's Compensation
Laws furnish a close analogy. 14 The inevitable injuries incident to the
operation of industry are a matter of great public concern, and the public
should bear the cost.' 5 Both the Workmen's and Unemployment Com-
pensation Laws impose liability on the employer regardless of any
wrongful act on his part-one for compensation for injuries and death
suffered in the course of employment; the other for injuries suffered
from the lack of employment. They both impose new liabilities, shift a
risk to business, look primarily to the protection of the wage-earner,
and apply only to employers employing a certain number of persons.16
' Separate employer accounts are maintained for each employer for bookkeep-
ing purposes only. P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1, §7(c)1. No provision is
made for merit rating, that is, assessing employers according to their unem-
ployment records, but the Act appoints a commission to study and report to the
1939 Legislature on the advisability of merit rating and/or an employer reserve.
system. Id. §7(c)3.
10 The Act does not mention employee contributions, but does expressly pro-
vide that the employers' contributions shall not be deducted in whole or in part
from the wages of employees. P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1, §7(a) 1.
"P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1, §3(a).
'Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 110, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 187, 55
L. ed. 112, 116 (1911) ; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. ed.
923 (1885) ; Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361, 25 Sup. Ct. 676, 49 L. ed. 1085 (1905) ;
Offield v. New York, N. H. and H. R. R., 203 U. S. 372, 27 Sup. Ct. 72, 51 L. ed.
231 (1906) ; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 27 Sup. Ct. 289, 51 L. ed. 499 (1907) ;
Nicchia v. New York, 254 U. S. 228, 41 Sup. Ct. 103, 65 L. ed. 235 (1920) ; Mc-
Glone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 111 S. W. 688 (1908).
"Epstein and Crary, Constitutiontal Aspects of the State Unemployment Insur-
ance Law (1936) S N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'r BULLETIN 215, 220.
"4 New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L. ed.
667 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 37 Sup. Ct. 255, 61 L. ed. 678
(1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260,
61 L. ed. 685 (1917) ; Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct.
553, 63 L. ed. 1058 (1919). It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of
the United States has sustained all forms of state compensation laws that have
come before it. McGovNEY, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1930) 766, n. 59.
"It is reasonable that the public should pay the whole cost of producing
what it wants, and a part of that cost is the pain and mutilation incident to pro-
duction. By throwing that loss upon the employer in the first instance we throw
it upon the public in the long run, and that is just" Arizona Copper Co. v. Ham-
mer, 250 U. S. 400, 433, 39 Sup. Ct. 553, 561, 63 L. ed. 1058, 1072 (1919).
" See Rice, A Note on the Constitutionality of State Unemployment Compensa-
tion Laws (1936) 3 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 138, 141; Legis. (1935)
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However, the Unemployment Compensation Law goes further than
the Workmen's Compensation Laws. The former imposes a liability
where none existed before. The latter supplanted the pre-existing
liability imposed by the common law, thus providing a consideration for
the substituted liability.1 Still they do impose a substantial new burden
by imposing liability regardless of fault.' 8 Under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws there is a causal connection between the employment
and the injury, since compensation is payable only if the injury arose
out of and in the course of the employment. However, by more efficient
management industry, meaning both the individual employer and all
employers working as a group, could decrease unemployment to a
minimum, just as more efficient management decreases injuries to a
minimum. 19
The Workmen's Compensation analogy is buttressed by a long line
of comparable cases. The Bank Deposit Guaranty Fund Cases20 upheld a
statute which assessed every state bank a certain percentage of its aver-
age daily deposits to protect the depositors of banks which became in-
solvent. This was held not a violation of due process. The Sheep Dog
cases21 held that a statute, which exacted contributions from all dog
owners to compensate owners of sheep injured or killed by dogs, irre-
spective of whose particular dog had created the loss, did not violate the
police power. Yet, in each of these groups of cases the parties were
assessed without regard to any wrongful act on their part for the benefit
of another group.
The Act does not involve denial of equal protection, because it
applies only to employers employing eight or more persons, and ex-
empts certain types of employers. The legislature has a wide discretion
in selecting where the cost shall fall. The fact that it discriminates in
favor of certain classes does not render its action arbitrary if the dis-
10 ST. Jo Hx's L. Rrv. 147, 154-155; (1936) 4 GEo. WAse. L. REv. 498, 500-502;
(1928) 25 GEORGETOWN L. J. 467, 469.
"' New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 201, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 252,
61 L. ed. 667, 674 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219,
234, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 263, 61 L. ed. 685, 694 (1917); Jacobson, The Wisconsin
Unemployment Compensation Law (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 420, 477; (1936) 21
MINN. L. Rtv. 97.
See Hughes, C. J., dissenting in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R.,
295 U. S. 330, 383, 55 Sup. Ct. 758, 777, 79 L. ed. 1468, 1494 (1935).
See Rice, A Note on the Constitutionality of State Unemployment Compensa-
tion Laws (1936) 3 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 138, 147-148; (1936) 4
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 498, 502-503.
:'Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55 L. ed. 112(1911).
ICole v. Hall, 103 Ill. 30 (1882) ; Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind. 62 (1866)
McGlone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 111 S. W. 688 (1908); People v. Van Horn,
46 Mich. 183, 9 N. W. 246 (1881); Longyear v. Buck, 83 Mich. 236, 47 N. W.
234 (1890); Holst v. Roe, 39 Ohio St. 340 (1883) ; Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. 317
(1862) ; Tenny v. Lenz, 16 Wis. 566 (1863).
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crimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction or if any state
of facts reasonably can be conceived to support it.22 Only where the
classification is wholly capricious or unreasonable will it be said that it
denies equal protection.2 3 To make the Act apply to all employers
would require such a large and complicated administrative machinery
as to defeat its very purpose. Exempting certain types of employers,
regardless of the number employed, is a provision long familiar to legis-
lative enactments. 24
Requiring employers with little or no unemployment to contribute
to a fund to help those who become unemployed, and at the same rate
as those employers having a great deal of unemployment, is not
a valid ground for attack on the Act. There is ample authority to
support the pooled fund features of the Act. The central pooling of
funds has been approved in -the Workmen's Compensation cases,2 -5
the Head Money cases,206 the Sheep Dog cases,2 7 and the Bank Deposit
Guaranty Fund Cases.28 Although individual employers may in many
cases do much to stabilize employment in their industries, there are
many factors over which they have little control. Today most in-
dustries are interdependent. A slack period in business in one indus-
'American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. 43,
45 L. ed. 102 (1900) ; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203, 22 Sup. Ct.
616, 46 L. ed. 872 (1902); New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152,
27 Sup. Ct. 188, 51 L. ed. 415 (1907); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59,
32 Sup. Ct. 192, 56 L. ed. 350 (1912); Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571,
35 Sup. Ct. 167, 59 L. ed. 364 (1915); Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis Co., 240
U. S. 342, 36 Sup. Ct. 370, 60 L. ed. 679 (1916) ; State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v.
Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540, 75 L. ed. 1248 (1931).
1 Bell's Gap R.R. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 10 Sup.
Ct. 533, 33 L. ed. 892 (1890) ; Connelly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540,
22 Sup. Ct. 431, 46 L. ed. 679 (1902) ; Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S.
412, 40 Sup. Ct. 560 64 L. ed. 989 (1920); Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v.
Day, 266 U. S. 71, 45 Sup. Ct. 12, 69 L. ed. 169 (1924) ; Louisville Gas and E. Co.
v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 48 Sup. Ct. 423, 72 L. ed. 770 (1928).
' Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. ed. 389
(1911); Brushaber v. Union P. R. R., 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 60 L. ed. 493
(1916); New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61
L. ed. 667 (1917) ; Middleton v. Texas Power and L. Co., 249 U. S. 152, 39 Sup.
Ct. 227, 63 L. ed. 527 (1919).
'Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 61
L. ed. 685 (1917).
' These cases approved a tax on every alien entering the United States, the
tax to be paid by the owner of the vessel bringing such alien. The fund so cre-
ated was used for the relief of indigent aliens. Edye v. Robertson; Cunard
Steamship Co. v. Robertson, 112 U.' S. 580, 5 Sup. Ct. 247, 28 L. ed. 798 (1884).
ISee Note 21, .rupra.
' Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55 L. ed. 112
(1911). Other cases of this type are: Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299,
13 L. ed. 996 (1851) (vessels not taking a pilot on entering or leaving port re-
quired to pay half pilotage into a fund for the relief of indigent pilots and their
dependents) ; Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct.
169, 68 L. ed. 388 (1924) (income of railroads in excess of a fair return required
to be paid into a fund to aid other roads in need of funds) ; State v. Cassidy, 22
Minn. 312 (1875) (tax on saloon-keepers to create a fund for the establishment
and maintenance of an institutiQn for inebriates).
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try, which may or may not be seasonable, affects other industries, often
causing greater unemployment in these than in the one directly affected.
These interlocking forces make it only just to place the burden indis-
criminately on industry as a whole. The pooling of funds would seem
to be the most feasible method for making unemployment compensation
effective.
One of the most formidable obstacles to the Act, according to the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland, is Railroad Retirement
Board v. Alton R. R.,29 which declared the Railroad Retirement Act30
unconstitutional. This Act treated all employers as a single employer,
requiring those with a small amount of superannuation to contribute
the same percentage of their payrolls to a common pension fund as
did those with a greater amount. 31 The Supreme Court found that this
was not consistent with due process. However, this Act is distinguish-
able from the Unemployment Compensation Act. It contained cer-
tain retroactive provisions which are not present in the latter Act
which is wholly prospective in its nature. For example, some, but not
all, railroads had employees over the retirement age fixed by the Act,
and those carriers who had no such employees were thus forced to
contribute immediately to pensions for the employees of others.3 2 Also,
there is a fundamental difference between pensions and unemploy-
ment compensation: The pension payments were to be based upon
ages, wages, and length of service, all possible of determination with
mathematical exactness so that the proportionate share of each car-
rier might have been fixed. On the other hand, unemployment, being
due to a combination of causes, does not lend itself to mathematical
exactness. It is a problem of industry as a whole. In contrast, super-
annuation can be attributed to individual carriers. Also, the Court
found -that pensions did not reasonably tend to improve interstate com-
merce, while the Unemployment Compensation Act is enacted under
the police power of the State.33
The unemployment compensation laws are attempts not only to
prevent so far as possible, but also to make adequate preparation for,
any recurrences of economic depressions. The economic grounds for
2295 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 758, 79 L. ed. 1468 (1935).
"48 Stat. 1283-1289 (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. §§201-214 (Supp. 1936).
The Court expressly distinguished Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S.
104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55 L. ed. 112 (1911); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washing-
ton, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 61 L. ed. 685 (1917); and Dayton-Goose
Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 169, 68 L. ed. 388 (1924),
which would seem to indicate that the Court is not opposed to a pooling of funds
when properly used.
'In contrast, no benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Act are
-payable until one year after the Act has gone into effect, and the amount of ben-
efits is based on services rendered after the enactment of the Act by persons upon
whose wages contributions have been paid.
'P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1, §2.
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such legislation are overwhelmingly forceful. "Here we are dealing
simply with the power of the Legislature to meet a growing danger
and peril to a large number of our fellow citizens, and we find nothing
in the act itself which is so arbitrary or unreasonable as to show that
it deprives any employer of his property without due process of law
or denies him the equal protection of the laws."'3 4
C. M. IVEY, JR.
Contracts-Duress-Business Compulsion
Plaintiff's policy of life insurance, with defendant company, included
the customary total and permanent disability clause, with waiver of
premiums after proof of disability. Plaintiff, alleging total and per-
manent disability, claimed the installments due him under the contract.
Defendant, denying the disability, insisted on the continued payment
of premiums by plaintiff in order to keep the policy in force. Plaintiff
paid the premiums under protest and brought this action to recover
the installments and premiums paid. A verdict in the trial court allowed
plaintiff to recover the disability installments and the premiums paid
under protest, with interest. The appellate court in reversing stated
that money paid voluntarily under protest cannot be recovered in the
absence of fraud, duress, or mistake.'
In determining the case the court apparently disregarded an impor-
tant though comparatively recent innovation in the law-the doctrine
of economic compulsion2 as a species of duress.
Anciently, duress in law could exist only where there were such
threats as would put one in fear of injury to life, limb, or liberty-
duress of person.3 Changing economic conditions brought about an
expansion of the concept of duress. The doctrine of duress of goods
evolved. This meant that a payment made to release one's property
from an unlawful seizure or retention was made under duress.4 Further
' W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews; E. C. Stearns and Co. v. Same; As-
sociated Industries of N. Y. State, Inc. v. Department of Labor of N. Y., 271
N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22, 26 (1936).
1 Ignatovig v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 16 F. Supp. 764 (M. D. Pa.
1935).
' The terms "economic compulsion," "business compulsion," and "moral duress"
are used interchangeably by the courts.
' "... it is to be known, that a man shall avoid his deed for manuas (menaces)
of imprisonment, albeit he were never imprisoned: for a man shall avoid his
own act for manuas in four cases, viz., 1. for fear of loose of member, 2. loose
of life, 3. of mayhem, and 4. imprisonment; otherwise it is for fear of battery,
which may be very slight, or for burning of his house, or taking away or de-
stroying his goods, or the like, for there he may have satisfaction by recovery in
damages." 2 Co. Inst. 483; Baily v. Devine, 123 Ga. 653, 51 S. E. 603 (1905).
'Lonergan v. Buford, 148 U. S. 581, 13 Sup. Ct. 684, 37 L. ed. 569 (1893)
(oppressive refusal to deliver cattle under contract); Cobb v. Charter, 32 Conn.
358 (1865) (mechanic's tools were withheld depriving him of a means of sup-
port); Du Vail v. Norris, 119 Ga. 947, 47 S. E. 212 (1904) (money paid to police
